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Abstract  
This paper regards the validation procedure of the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 formula, 
used to calculate the hazardous areas extensions in places where explosive gas 
atmospheres may be present. In industrial activity, a typical event which cause 
explosive atmosphere consists of  damaging and leakage from unions, gaskets, valves 
of pipes and vessels. At this purpose, in this work it has been taken into account the 
accidental discharge of flammable gas into a quiescent atmosphere through an 
orifice. Validation has been performed by comparing calculated values with 
experimental data. Two gases have been taken into account: methane and hydrogen. 
Different scenarios have been analyzed, each one differing from the others in the gas 
release cross section and in the vessel pressure. Results show that the formula fits 
well not catastrophic industrial accident situations. 
Keywords: Risk Analysis, Explosive gas atmospheres, Hazardous Areas Extension. 
1.    Introduction 
 
Object of this paper is the risk assessment in industrial activities as regards releases of 
flammable gases from pressure systems, which can imply the potential for an 
explosive atmosphere. Such releases into the atmosphere can be expected to occur 
periodically or occasionally during normal operation from, for example, relief valves 
(‘Primary releases’). On the other hand, accidental releases, which are not likely to 
occur during normal operation (‘Secondary releases’) are to be taken into account; 
this kind of releases regards for example small leaks from pipe-fittings, joints, 
flanges, valve glands, seals of pumps. 
In the work here described particular attention has been paid to gases lighter than the 
air, such as hydrogen and methane. 
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In order to guarantee the safety and health protection of workers potentially at risk 
from explosive atmospheres in industrial activities, hazardous area classification 
should be carried out as an integral part of the risk assessment to identify areas where 
controls over ignition sources are needed, as regards construction, installation and use 
of equipments. Area classification is based on the frequency and persistence of the 
potentially explosive atmosphere and on the degree of ventilation provided to ensure 
that any explosive atmosphere does not persist for an extended time.  
The work here described particularly regards the determination of the hazardous area 
extent. The area where the concentration of the considered flammable substance is 
higher than the LEL (‘Lower Explosive Limit’) is, by definition, an hazardous zone; 
the area outside the LEL boundary may be considered a non dangerous zone, if the 
gas concentration is enough lower than LEL. Authors previously had studied a 
formula to calculate hazardous area extent whenever dangerous quantities and 
concentrations of flammable gas may arise; this formula had been analytically found 
out, based on the diffusion theory of a free turbulent round jet and it had been 
compared both with calculations performed by the analytical software ‘Effects’ and 
with numerical simulations carried out with the Computational Fluid Dynamics code 
‘Phoenics’ [1], [2] [3]. This study had been performed by taking into account: 
methane, ammonia and hydrogen, but also heavier gases as propane and butane. 
Furthermore the formula had been introduced in the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 
[4],“Guide for classification of hazardous areas”, which, in compliance with the 
European Standard IEC EN 60079-10 [5], regards the classification of hazardous 
areas, whenever dangerous quantities and concentrations of flammable gas or vapour 
may arise. 
This paper illustrates the validation procedure of the formula, by comparing it with 
experimental data.  
2.  Materials  and  methods 
 
2.1  Method for calculating hazardous area extent 
 
The Italian Guide CEI 31-35 reports eq. (1) able to calculate the extent of hazardous 
area when a flammable gas is discharged into a quiescent atmosphere through an 
orifice. Looking at eq. (1),  the distance dz is the distance from the orifice, along the 
central axis of the jet, at which gas concentration is reduced to the lower explosive 
limit (‘LEL’) of the gas. 
This equation had been analytically found out by studying the released gas behaviour 
(subsonic or sonic), which depends on the containment vessel pressure value, Pr 
respect to the atmospheric one, Pa. Besides, it had taken into account the relationship 
among the concentration profile of gas, along the axis of the jet, the distance to the 
orifice and the jet discharge diameter. Finally it had to be considered the strong 
dependence between the discharged gas concentration and its density (thus its 
molecular mass) related to the surrounding air [6],[7],[8],[9],[10],[11]. 
 
d 
,
	 
PM,√S                                                        (1) 
 
where 
 kdz is a safety coefficient applied to the LEL for the calculation of 
Pr is the absolute pressure inside the vessel [Pa]
S is the cross sectional area of the outlet [m
M is the gas molecular mass [kg/kmol]
LEL is the lower explosive limit 
Fig. 1 shows an indoor jet flow of methane computed by 
Dynamics software Fluent
air. The parameter dz represents the distance from the source of release at which the 
gas concentration (Xm%) along central axis, related to the gas co
outlet, is reduced to the LEL. The area where the concentration of the gas is higher 
than its LEL is, by definition, an hazardous zone; the external area may be considered 
a non dangerous zone, if the gas concentration is enough lower th
actually, the hazardous area is increased by the safety factor 
range from 0,25 to 0,75 
boundary.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Figure 1. Hazardous zone around a jet 
Referring to the distance 
example, a gas release from a damaged flange
approximately calculated by considering the volume of a cone having height 
depending on the jet direction 
resulting from the envelope of all 
Figure 2.
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ncentration at the 
an LEL; in fact, 
kdz (whose typical values 
[4]), i.e. the distance dz is calculated at the 
 
 
flow of methane  
dz, the hazardous zone can be computed. Fig. 2 shows
. The explosive volume can be 
The hazardous zone around the pipe is a sphere 
the possible explosive volumes. 
 
 Hazardous zone around a jet flow of gas 
 
(Xm%<LEL) 
 (Xm%>LEL) 
LEL boundary 
 
 
kdz ·LEL 
, as 
dz and 
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2.2  Experimental data 
 
In order to assess the validity of the dz formula, shown in eq. (1), experimental tests 
have been considered. The first one consists in natural gas (92% methane) supplied 
from a vessel via a pressure regulator (ranging from  3.5 to 71 bar) to a nozzle whose 
internal diameter is equal to 2,7 mm [7].                                                                                                                           
The second configuration consists of hydrogen leak through a circular orifice whose 
diameter is 0,5 mm. Hydrogen comes out from a 19 l vessel. By means of a valve 
connected with a pressurizing system, it is possible to change the storage pressure 
from 50 to 400 bar [12]. 
The third configuration consists of hydrogen releasing at 400 bar, through a 0,2 mm 
nozzle [13].    
The fourth configuration consists of hydrogen release, from a tank pressurized to 100 
bar, through a 3 mm nozzle [14].    
For both methane and hydrogen, gas-air mixture concentrations have been measured 
along jet axis, at different distances from the release source.  
As regards source diameters, they are of the order of magnitude which is typical of 
small leaks. In fact these experimental data are used to validate eq. (1) which had 
been studied referring to releases from small orifices. 
It can be noticed hydrogen pressures are higher than methane ones; this is due to the 
fact that normally hydrogen is stored in gas cylinders at higher pressures than the 
ones at which natural gas is distributed. 
3. Results and discussion 
 
Fig.3 shows, for different vessel pressures, both experimental (points) and calculated 
(continuous lines) dz values which are function of methane concentration (% in 
volume) data. Source diameter is equal to 2,7 mm. 
 
Figure 3. Comparison between experimental and calculated dz values for methane releases 
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Figg.4 and 5 show, for different vessel pressures, both experimental (points) and 
calculated (continuous lines) dz values which are function of hydrogen concentration 
(% in volume) data. Source diameters are equal to 0,2 mm, 0,5 mm and 3 mm.  
 
Figure 4. Comparison between experimental and calculated dz values for hydrogen release (0,5 mm) 
 
Figure 5. Comparison between experimental and calculated dz values for hydrogen release (0,2-3 mm) 
In order to compare d experimental data with the ones calculated by eq. (1), LEL has 
been substituted with the measured gas concentration values and kdz has been 
considered equal to 1. 
As it regards both methane (releasing from 2,7 mm nozzle) data and the ones 
regarding hydrogen releasing from 3 mm nozzle, it comes out that the maximum 
percent deviation between experimental and calculated values is very low (11%). 
Instead, as it regards hydrogen leak from 0,5 mm nozzle, the calculated dz values are 
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about 1,7 times the correspondent experimental data and, as it regards hydrogen leak 
from 0,2 mm, the calculated dz values are about 1,1 times the correspondent 
experimental data. It is important to note that all hydrogen experimental dz data are 
lower than the ones calculated by eq. (1). Therefore, eq. (1) is precautionary and it 
turns to safety advantage, thus it can be used in order to assure that, at distances 
higher than the calculated dz, gas concentration is lower than LEL.  
Besides, it has to be taken into account eq. (1) estimates gas outflows without 
considering friction and contraction effects during discharging from the holes. This 
formula had been found out assuming an ideal maximum value of mass flow rate. 
Actually it has to consider a discharge coefficient. Literature [5] suggests discharge 
coefficient, Cd, values ranging from about 0,3 to about 0,9; obviously this factor is as 
higher as discharge section has lower values. Furthermore, the discrepancy between 
calculated and experimental data could be due to the fact that for small jets, there are 
more fluctuations in the resulting plume, which implies lower averaged 
measurements [15]. 
4. Conclusions 
The work here described regards the determination of the hazardous area extent in 
places where an explosive atmosphere may occur, whenever sonic releases of 
methane or hydrogen from high pressure sources may arise. At this purpose the 
formula which had been introduced in the Italian Guide CEI 31-35 has been validated 
by experimental data on axial decay of gas from under-expanded methane and 
hydrogen jets. Results confirm the validity of dz formula as regards not catastrophic 
events where source diameters are of few millimetres. It is to understand in greater 
detail the over prediction for leakages from very small nozzles. 
Future development regards eq.(1) validation against experimental data regarding 
heavy flammable gases as propane and butane.  
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